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SUMMARY  
International human rights law is ever more pervading the conduct of international relations 
and the development of international law thereof. It is only after the humanity has witnessed 
human rights violations of an intolerable magnitude that it begins to insert provisions in 
international statutes that would envisage an option to protect those rights, albeit with an 
unenviable progress. Every rule prescribing a greater protection for the individuals as the 
most vulnerable subjects of international law is necessarily perceived by states as a 
threatening infringement upon their territorial integrity and henceforth sovereignty. The 
ancient and seemingly obsolete state paradigm is competing on a constant basis with the 
anthropocentrism as an emerging value and aim for the international community to strive for. 
Given the lack of opportunity for a single individual to convince a state of his paramount 
importance as compared to state sovereignty, an occasion where a whole people claim a 
collective right to determine their fate themselves deserves a much closer attention. At this 
point, the inviolability of boundaries might elude. Self-determination of peoples as a 
peremptory norm of international law is supposed to grant a right to escape from injustices 
and secede from a sovereign authority that at some point has commenced an oppressive 
exercise of its powers. Therefore, right to remedial secession as a compromise between the 
two competing paradigms is suggested as a necessary means to ensure human-rights 
compliant and contemporarily-centred interaction between the state and its people. 
However, the near inexistence of the right to remedial secession in international statutory law 
induces to search for its legality in another source of international law. Hence, the aim of this 
research is to argue that remedial secession is a right that can be invoked as legitimately, as 
any other human right mentioned in any of the international human rights documents. It is 
claimed to be existent in international customary law. 
The research is specifically focused on federal states since their system of governance 
illustrates a symbiosis between the classical state paradigm and the autonomy of its subjects. 
In particular, it is argued that peoples inhabiting respective federal units possess a right to 
remedial secession due to the fact that the whole existence of the state who claims authority 
over them is based upon the consent of those peoples to give up a certain portion of autonomy 
to the sovereign. In this case, a remedy for unauthorized exercise of state power should in a 
normative sense be provided by federal constitutional law. 
For the purposes of this research, four case studies of secession of federal units are selected as 
exemplary state practice in the case of gross human rights violations: Bangladesh, Chechnya, 
South Carolina and Kosovo. While circumstances of each case provide for different criteria to 
be met for the secession to qualify as remedial, a number of prevalent features appear 
throughout all four cases. Specifically, remedial secession calls for existence of a 
humanitarian crisis that has emerged from systematic human rights violations at different 
levels and a clear breach of competence to exercise authority by the federal sovereign.  
3 
 
 
 
As a matter of fact, however, it does not seem to be objective to make conclusions about 
definite numbers of casualties or concrete period during which those violations have to be 
exercised. Moreover, federal constitutional laws fail to envisage any mechanism of secession 
for units that have in essence concluded a social contract with their sovereigns upon certain 
guarantees. Right to secession, if mentioned at all, bears merely a declaratory character and 
through the wording of the law may even be interpreted as a completely different legal notion. 
In sum, ambiguity of international law regarding remedial secession and secession in general 
is perfectly reflected in constitutional law of separate states. 
While it may be asserted that right to remedial secession exists indeed, peoples invoking it are 
subject to very specific circumstances and, in fact, possess a very limited opportunity to 
legitimately justify its invocation. The difficulty is posed already from the legal perspective, 
not even mentioning the political perspective where the state sovereignty paradigm prevails. 
Therefore, an inference from the aforementioned case studies is the following: remedial 
secession bears an excessively theoretical nature at the moment and needs an in-depth 
elaboration not only in soft law and judgments of the International Court of Justice, but also 
in actual statutory law both on international and national level. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of numerous secessionist movements in the 21
st
 century, a legitimate question 
arises of what legal framework should regulate the issue. The balancing of human rights with 
classical state sovereignty paradigms is becoming an ever-more complicated task, finding the 
solution for which is crucial if international community desires to be guided by the 
considerations of humanity. Such scholars as A. Pavkovic and P. Radan note the painful 
contemporary abundance of violent secessions, as well as violent secession attempts which, 
being invoked as a remedy for political and social justices, quite frequently acquire a dubious 
status.
1
 Moreover, the open issues left by the illustrative Kosovo’s secession raise a valid 
concern of whether self-determination as an umbrella concept for secession is legitimate 
under any circumstances. If the answer is in negative, the nature of restrictions and exceptions 
to the general self-determination needs to be examined.  
Yet another concern arises when considering secession as an exceptional occasion of self-
determination at very specific point only. There has been a discussion around the argument 
that self-determination does not entail the right to secession as such at all, subject to the very 
specific case of remedial secession. As the name suggests, it provides for secession in the case 
a remedy of last resort is absolutely necessary. However, the legality of this limited right is 
also yet deeply questionable. 
To shed light on the issue of legality of remedial secession, the following research question 
is posed: has remedial secession evolved as a customary international rule regarding federal 
states? 
Moreover, a peculiar state of affairs emerges in the case of federal countries. Secession under 
federal constitutional laws is subject to special conditions that in general retain a number of 
similarities. Therefore, secession is examined through the lens of federalism as a factor giving 
specific importance to this right. 
In this regard, several sub-questions are also analysed throughout the thesis to provide a better 
insight into the details of the main question. The sub-questions for reflection are the 
following: 
1. Why is secession important with respect to federal states? 
2. Has right to secession been recognized and established in public international law? 
3. What are the conditions for secession to qualify as remedial? More specifically, what 
rights need to be in violation and how grave should such violations be? 
                                                          
1
 Aleksandar Pavkovic, Peter Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession (London: 
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), p. 3. Available on: 
https://books.google.lv/books?id=AxwpDAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=secession&hl=ru&sa=X&ved=
0ahUKEwin6a2t8IrbAhUmM5oKHfVdDNYQ6AEITzAF#v=onepage&q=secession&f=false. Accessed May 16, 
2018. 
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The thesis is primarily based on doctrinal methodology. Being divided in three chapters, it 
embraces interdisciplinary research, reflecting the nearly inevitable symbiosis of law and 
politics. The first chapter analyses the complicated and nuanced balance between the two 
fundamental legal concepts of right to secession and territorial integrity. With a specific focus 
on the former concept, legal status of right to secession de lege lata is examined. In order to 
embrace a versatile and contemporary approach to examination of this legal issue, normative 
legal philosophy de lege ferenda is also applied to the analysis of right to secession and at this 
point remedial secession in particular. As an additional point, the concept of a “people” that 
may invoke remedial secession is sought to be defined. In sum, the overall doctrinal analysis 
is viewed constantly through the prism of the legal philosophies of legal positivism and 
normativism. 
The second chapter contains a comprehensive analysis through the method of comparative 
federalism. More specifically, state practice with respect to denial of or support for the 
secession and the subsequent circumstances pervasive and necessary for the secession to 
qualify as remedial is examined through the method of legal case study. Furthermore, federal 
constitutional laws and the mechanisms envisaged thereof for federal units to secede, as well 
as the equality of distribution of competences between the federal units and the sovereign are 
examined in detail. Thus, the legality of remedial secession is sought for in the actual case-
law of several existing and historical federal states. The chosen cases are the secessions by 
Bangladesh, South Carolina, Chechnya and Kosovo for the particular relevance they bring to 
the evaluation of remedial practice. 
The third chapter provides a completely fresh view to remedial secession, in that it swifts 
away from the extensive legal analysis of existence of a right rather touching upon the 
practical feasibility of remedial secession. In particular, the subsequent ability for the newly 
formed state to pass the test of effectiveness, as well as to meet the statehood criteria 
necessary to exercise a practically feasible existence is emphasized. Lastly, the concept of 
state responsibility for the denial of peremptory norms is discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1: RELEVANCE OF THE RIGHT TO SECESSION FROM THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW PERSPECTIVE 
1. RESTRICTIVE NATURE OF FEDERALISM TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
1.1. Conceptualization of federalism in the context of self-
determination 
Federalism should be viewed as a factor of paramount significance in the actual 
implementation of collective human rights prescribed by international law, in that it represents 
a peculiar legal relationship between the state and its subjects. This relationship rests on 
acknowledgement of existence of a nexus among otherwise legally and ideologically different 
units. The state itself thus merely provides a framework within which those units can 
peacefully coexist. The argument upon which the following claims rest is that the federal 
framework is a decisive restriction in the realization of aspirations of its respective units with 
the intent of separation. 
To continue with this argument, determination of the extent to which a federal state has been 
accorded delegated powers and persists legally as a sovereign directly affects invocation of 
collective rights by the units. As if a problem of what rights can be exercised by these units 
were not a substantial matter of legal discussion itself, the concept of what a federal state is 
appears ambiguous. Constitutionalists J. Fischer and J. Delors find it important to distinguish 
respectively between the terms of confederation or federation of nation-states and federation or 
federal state. While the former denotes a rather historical purely international grouping of states 
in the context of 19
th
 century Germany and USA, the latter is a full-fledged sovereign within 
the meaning of international law.
2
 For the purposes of analysing the current status of right to 
secession as the legal consequence of self-determination, the latter definition is applied. 
As the consequent matter, exercise of rights by units should depend on their collective 
delegation or deprivation of powers upon the federal sovereign as the central authority. The 
idea that autonomy and thus self-determination of peoples is a natural sequel of federalist 
system stems from the philosophy of legal pluralism. With respect to the concept of federalism, 
it underlines affiliation of multiple groups to different nation-states within a federation.
3
 A 
crucial element underlying the whole essence of nation-states having united in a singular 
sovereign is decentralization. Here a strong form of what J. Locke would call a social contract 
is visible. The state is based on a conditional transfer of powers by its people for the sake of a 
                                                          
2
 “Federation and the Constitutional Theory of the State”. The Jean Monnet Center for International and 
Regional Economic Law & Justice. Available on: https://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/00/00f0301EN-
02.html. Accessed March 19, 2018. 
3
 Paul Schiff Berman, “Federalism and International Law Through the Lens of Legal Pluralism”, GW Law 
Faculty Publications & Other Works, 2008, p. 1155. Available on: 
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.lv/&httpsredir=1&article=1086
&context=faculty_publications. Accessed March 19, 2018. 
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more effective enjoyment of their rights and greater protection.
4
 The aforementioned 
conditionality a fortiori applies to federations since they present artificial compositions. 
Legislative power is granted to the nation-states by a deliberative government that is intended 
as no constraint to their autonomy.
5
 Accordingly, normative systems of those nation-states exist 
separately from each other, albeit with at times substantial overlapping areas.
6
 
However, at this point the issue of jurisdictional redundancy emerges. Varying and conflicting 
regulations by federal, national and international laws render it hard to distinguish, which 
norms are binding and legitimate in a specific case.
7
 Particular hardship is brought by the 
federal constitutional law which is not automatically subordinated to international legal norms 
and therefore occasionally fails to incorporate certain provisions of international human rights 
law.
8
 The issue of hierarchy of legal norms is illustrated in the famous Medellin v. Texas 
judgment by the US Supreme Court. It reversed an International Court of Justice (hereinafter 
ICJ) judgment in the case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals against the US by 
stating in part C that international treaties are subject to a “post-ratification understanding” of 
signatory nations in terms of their own binding federal laws. Thus, enforceability of 
international law depends on domestic law provisions. Further it was held that  
absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum 
State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State.
9
 
Conclusion that stems from the judgment is that federal states can in most cases be considered 
the ultimate decision-makers as regards the actual implementation of international law. 
Specifically, the creeping federal power of such states as the US subjugates international law 
under its constitutional provisions. This infringes severely upon the highly valuable right to 
self-determination in particular which seems to be facing a grim reality from the point of view 
of nation-states and expression of their autonomous will. Although several Harvard Law 
School theorists note that federalism as a composition of different systems is naturally intended 
to provide units with the right to exit,
10
 even position of the international community is not 
clear on this issue. For instance, the ICJ states in its advisory opinion regarding Reparation for 
Injuries Suffered in the service of the United Nations that  
                                                          
4
 “Locke’s Political Philosophy”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available on: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/#SepPowDisGov. Accessed March 19, 2018. 
5
 Martha A. Field, “The Structures of Federalism”, American University International Law Review, Issue 2, Vol. 
8, 1993, p. 445. Available on: 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1861&context=auilr. Accessed March 19, 
2018. 
6
 Supra note 3. Accessed March 19, 2018. 
7
 Ibid., p. 1159. 
8
 Mark V. Tushnet, “Federalism and International Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order”, The Wayne 
Law Review, Vol. 47, 2001, p. 847. Available on: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=facpub. Accessed March 19, 
2018. 
9
 Jose Ernesto Medellin, Petitioner v. Texas (25 March, 2008, unreported). Available on: 
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/552/491.html. Accessed March 19, 2018. 
10
 Supra note 5. Accessed March 19, 2018. 
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The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or 
in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the 
community.
11 
 It is thereby open to interpretation of federal sovereigns what the nature and rights of their 
respective subjects are. The “needs of the community” can similarly lie at any extreme: should 
it be preservation of state sovereignty or respect for autonomy of the peoples. 
1.2. Principle of autonomy vs. principle of territorial integrity 
As soon as invocation of a pertinent human right to self-determination is being considered, 
inevitable clash between two fundamental international principles arises. The two values, 
although intended to intertwine and complement each other, in broad terms present quite 
opposite claims. While the first concerns an essential right given to peoples in the course of 
development of international community, the second embodies the perpetually prevalent state 
supremacy. The issue here evolves around the balancing of these two principles. For the 
purposes of this subchapter, the concept of self-determination is examined within the meaning 
of United Nations (hereinafter UN) Charter. 
In the modern era of conscientious human rights compliance, it would be reasonable to begin 
the analysis with the placement of self-determination within the system of international law. 
Importantly, it stands as one of the very purposes for which the United Nations was formed, as 
the second paragraph of article one of the UN Charter holds: 
to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples.
12 
By analogy applying this provision to the system of federalism, the legal consequence would be 
that the sovereign should at all times respect aspirations of its subjects towards self-
determination and despite any secession movements endeavour to preserve amity in further 
interactions with the latter. Moreover, the UN Charter imposes an even stronger obligation 
upon states by the specifically set out Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories. 
In article 73 it upholds the paramount importance of interests of inhabitants from territories 
desiring to acquire self-governance, as well as even obliges in part b the states “to assist them 
in the progressive development of their free political institutions”.13 
However, self-governance is arguably an incomplete form of the right to self-determination. It 
concerns the principle of autonomy which stands as a compromise in the interstices of self-
determination and territorial integrity of states. In the writings of such jurists as Hannum it 
appears that autonomy is equated to a “less-than-sovereign self-determination”.14 Therefore, the 
sui generis nature of self-governance resembles relationship between federal subjects and their 
                                                          
11
 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, International Court of 
Justice (April 11, 1949, unreported). Available on: http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/4/004-19490411-
ADV-01-00-EN.pdf. Accessed March 19, 2018. 
12
 United Nations Charter. San Francisco, (June 26, 1945). Available on: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/un-charter-full-text/. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
13
 Ibid. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
14
 Thomas D. Musgrave, Self Determination and National Minorities (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 208. 
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respective sovereign. Federalism per se appears as an intermediate level combining the two 
opposite principles and accordingly providing a fruitful basis for examining legal status of 
autonomy as such at a down-to-earth level. Although at no point the relevance of autonomy as 
an international principle is doubted, it becomes unclear as to what should be the extent of 
support by the states. The UN Charter does not explain what “assistance” to these groups 
means, the more so guarantee of independence is never even mentioned. While it would 
arguably be excessively ambitious to expect a detailed explanation from the text of the UN 
Charter, as a matter of a fundamental principle it does not uphold independence in a declaratory 
manner to the least extent. 
The principle of autonomy once again appears in the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. Merely for the sake of clarity, it is useful to explore the definitions applied 
thereby. In particular, article four maintains peoples indisputably possess the right to autonomy 
or self-government regarding their internal affairs and autonomous functions in the exercise of 
their right to self-determination.
15
 In essence, this wording implies that self-determination does 
not expand beyond the obviously restrictable self-governance. 
Any kinds of restrictions thereof are put by the overwhelming authority of the principle of 
territorial integrity. Judge Huber contemplates that as the other side of the coin, it involves 
exercise of an exclusive control and right to display activities of the state within its territory.
16
 
UN Charter enshrines this principle in the famous article 2.4: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
17
 
Thus, however important human rights may have become, territorial integrity is still considered 
a cornerstone of international security and peace. The existing legal doctrine even suggests that 
the principle is divided into two parts – territorial preservation and territorial sovereignty18 – 
obviously excluding the possibility of secession. Internal or external intrusions upon it 
accordingly constitute a threat to the established international order. 
By taking a weighing and balancing approach, the contemporary universality of territorial 
integrity is nevertheless questionable. The ever-stronger development of human rights should 
permit leeways in this otherwise supreme legal principle. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 as a 
pinpoint of major breakthrough in this area has put forward in part eight an obligation for states 
to ensure equal rights and self-determination for peoples  
                                                          
15
 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, No. 61/295 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. (September 13, 2007). Available on: 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
16
 Supra note 14, p. 180. 
17
 Supra note 12. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
18
 Stuart Elden, “Contingent Sovereignty Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders”, SAIS Review, Vol. 
26, No. 1, 2006, p. 11. Available on: https://progressivegeographies.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/contingent-
sovereignty.pdf. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
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acting at all times in conformity […] with the relevant norms of international law, 
including those relating to territorial integrity of States.
19
 
Compared to other international legal documents, the same feature is present: self-
determination must be respected subject to the mandatory norm of territorial integrity. While at 
first sight this assertion appears self-contradictory, it simply implies that territorial integrity 
should provide for exceptions, even if very limited and narrow. It is thus further necessary to 
explore what the narrow area of legal exceptions does and should involve. 
1.3. Decolonization principle as an established rule  
It can be claimed with confidence that federalism has contributed to a very specific, yet 
absolute occasion when autonomy unconditionally takes prevalence. Rights of peoples within 
non-self-governing territories are accorded a greater weight in the case of colonial territories. 
Threat to disruption of state sovereignty is at one unambiguous point considered less relevant 
than threat to fundamental human rights. The occasion in question focuses on decolonization 
which has emerged as a universal remedy for the constant longstanding and massive human 
rights violations and suppression of peoples. 
The remedy embodied in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 illustrates the novel 
trend that has taken place following the World War II. Widespread human rights awareness has 
facilitated express acknowledgement of such values as “inalienable right to complete freedom”, 
as well as “the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory”20 for all 
peoples. Despite the fact that disruption of territorial integrity is strictly forbidden by this 
resolution, “alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” of peoples is at the same time held 
to be an “impediment to the promotion of world peace”.21 
Although the wording here is not as strong as in the UN Charter, where threat to territorial 
integrity is directly associated with threat to peace, it is nevertheless a document which finally 
speaks about threats to fundamental human rights as presenting at least an impediment to 
peace. The right to self-determination afforded to the peoples is, however, very limited in the 
aforementioned resolution. Surprisingly, from the UN documents in general the explicit term 
“colonialism” has been interpreted narrowly and thus presents a problem. The application of 
Resolution 1514 has been subject to a “salt water test” which in essence is fulfilled only by the 
colonial territories that are or have been geographically separated from the mainland of the 
state they have been subjected to. Having acquired a political rather than a legal connotation, it 
appears that geographically contiguous territories have been excluded from the definition of 
Resolution 1514.
22
 It does not mean that the latter do not possess the right to self-
                                                          
19
 Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act. Helsinki, 1975. Available on: 
https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act?download=true. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
20
 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, No. 1514 (XV). (December 14, 1960). Available on: 
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
21
 Ibid. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
22
 Steven Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p. 74. Available on: 
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determination. It simply means that they fall within the narrow area where exceptions are to be 
searched. 
1.3.1. Uti possidetis juris  
However, decolonization does not only imply the availability of right to secession through the 
territorial element. What is specifically relevant to the analysis of secession and, in particular, 
remedial secession, is the doctrine of uti possidetis juris because it emphasizes the people with 
a common spiritual belonging having faced violation of their rights by the dominating power as 
another element. Hence, before going into a detailed analysis of what elements self-
determination comprises and in what cases it can legally lead to secession, it may prove useful 
to touch upon another legal principle that helps support a claim of the people from a non-self-
governing territory to remedy the wrong that has been inflicted upon them.  
The doctrine of uti possidetis juris has specifically emerged from the principles of self-
determination and non-interference in the internal affairs meaning that jurisdiction and 
sovereignty of a country confines within the original delimitations of colonial administrative 
borders.
23
 Essentially, a claim is stronger when existence of a state can historically be proven 
since peoples can associate themselves not only with a spiritual feeling, but also with a 
geographically delimited area. 
The legal force of this uti possidetis juris should indeed not be underestimated, for even the ICJ 
has admitted in paragraph 23 of judgment in the frontier dispute case between Burkina Faso 
and Republic of Mali that in the process of decolonization it has acquired nature of a general 
principle of law: 
Uti possidetis, as a principle which upgraded former administrative delimitations, 
established during the colonial period, to international frontiers, is therefore a 
principle of a general kind which is logically connected with this form of 
decolonization wherever it occurs.
24 
The opposing view by some scholars is that uti possidetis juris should not be understood as a 
general principle of law because it bears purely an international law character and has not been 
transferred to international law from domestic legal systems. They rather argue that compliance 
with it has been demonstrated by the opinio juris and hence uti possidetis juris should be a 
customary law norm.
25
 In such case argument in favour of self-determination would be even 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
https://books.google.lv/books?id=Pbntu7mntWQC&pg=PA74&lpg=PA74&dq=salt+water+test+international+la
w&source=bl&ots=8yeFFCmHXJ&sig=nKffizfMgKOjkHU0WwBa0Zf2rHc&hl=ru&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi6p
Nfq0frZAhWJ6CwKHcqYAUwQ6AEIRDAD#v=onepage&q=salt%20water%20test%20international%20law&
f=false. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
23
 Enver Hasani, Self-determination, Territorial Integrity and International Stability: The Case of Yugoslavia 
(Vienna: National Defence Academy Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management, 2003), pp. 19-20. 
Available on: http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/hasa03.pdf. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
24
 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/ Republic of Mali), International Court of Justice 
Judgment of 22 December 1986, para 23. Available on: http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/69/069-
19861222-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. Accessed March 20, 2018. 
25
 Edited by Christian Walter, Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Kavus Abushov, Self-determination and Secession 
in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 99-100. 
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more grounded, since it would be manifested in state practice as an important source of 
international law. 
Moving further from the specific argument of uti possidetis juris, it is necessary to examine 
what the important occasions on which the principle of territorial integrity might be set aside in 
favour of self-determination are. For such purpose, legal scholar Daniele Archibugi puts 
forward a general statement that although international community in broad terms supports the 
meaning of self-determination in the context of colonialism, obvious exceptions could be 
demands of minorities and ethnic or cultural groups.
26
 Indeed, the importance of self-
determination and its further expressions is reinforced given the existence of considerable 
human rights violations. 
2. LEGAL STATUS OF SECESSION 
2.1. Interstices of self-determination 
A group of peoples that genuinely desires to acquire more autonomy than feasible within the 
limits of assistance that is being provided to non-self-governing territories currently 
experiences a hard time. The more it is true when full-fledged independence rather than a 
greater form of autonomy is pursued. The principal issue here evolves around the dubious 
question of whether self-determination embodies automatic right to secession. Solidarist stance 
on the matter is lacking both from the practice of members of international community and 
statutory text of human rights law.
27
 Nevertheless, in order to find lacunae in the text of 
international legal documents that could provide a place for right to secession, a comprehensive 
analysis of the fundamental sources of international human rights law is conducted. 
The beginning point of the analysis might bring some disappointment since self-determination 
as an inalienable human right is not explicitly mentioned in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (hereinafter UDHR) which can reasonably be considered the cornerstone 
document of human rights enshrining the practices that have evolved into customary 
international law. The sole ambiguous part which barely touches upon this right is article two: 
[…] no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or 
international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
28
 
Surprisingly enough, the legal provision merely speaks about human equality irrespective of 
territorial belonging, at the same time by no means putting forward a right to determine this 
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very belonging on a voluntary basis. It appears strongly that on the face of it international 
community adopts the approach of legal neutrality: secession is first and foremost neither 
allowed, nor prohibited.
29
 Therefore, it is necessary to deepen the analysis by examining more 
detailed human rights documents. 
Hence, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR) embodies 
far more concrete stance regarding self-determination. Firstly, it is set out as the most important 
right in the very first article. Secondly, the very first paragraph of this article contains the 
following wording: “by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status”.30 The 
promising provision seems carte blanche to peoples that are willing to secede as compared to 
the tight and rigid provisions of the UN Charter and UDHR. Beyond any doubt, the right to 
determine political status can lead to ultimate exercise of the right to secession if the desire of 
such status equates to political independence. 
Furthermore, the third paragraph of the very same article stipulates that states not only have the 
obligation to administer the non-self-governing territories, but also “shall promote the 
realization of the right of self-determination”.31 Thus, the ICCPR prolifically complements the 
narrow set of state obligations imposed by the UN Charter. By invoking once again the 
argument of federalist system as an intermediary, it can be asserted that a system which in itself 
is merely a political notion should by the same merit allow formations and legitimate 
expressions of similar political nature, regardless of the generality of international legal norms 
regulating the matter. Although “promotion of right to self-determination” is per se a mildly 
worded obligation, it is nevertheless the only legal provision that envisages any legal 
consequences of self-determination. Moreover, the right to secession here stems quite as a 
natural legal consequence. 
Interestingly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also 
enshrines the right to self-determination in its first article,
32
 albeit the purpose of this Covenant 
is to cover a completely separate and even less recognized and internationally respected 
generation of human rights. Needless to question whether the importance of self-determination 
has been overestimated. Both Covenants expose it as the most crucial right which should be 
reminded of in lists of any types of rights. Therefore, the relevant inference that should be made 
is that self-determination is important from the perspective of two generations of human rights 
simultaneously. Given its multiple mention in human rights documents, it can be asserted that 
secession is a logical sequel of self-determination envisaged by international law. 
In this respect, the scholar Lea Brilmayer presents an interesting view. In her distinguished 
paper under the title of “Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation” she 
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denies the existence of inconsistency between the principles of self-determination and 
territorial integrity at all. Instead, the allegedly competing principles complement each other 
because territorial integrity is threatened only by the right to rebel. Right to secession on its part 
is to be carefully distinguished from the right to rebel since it involves invocation of a human 
right and not a simple disruption of peace and security. Above all, territorial integrity in her 
mind means nothing without essential human right being complied with within such territory.
33
 
2.2. The definition of “people” 
Another yet no less important question is which “people” are eligible to exercise secession. The 
term presents serious lacunae, for it is as broad and imprecise as self-determination. All the 
documents analysed previously fail to make any specifications. The more it is true even as 
regards the UN Charter which for the purpose of putting a general framework speaks only 
about the “principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” in its article 1.2. 
Seemingly, the only group that certainly falls within the notion of peoples are the inhabitants of 
former colonial territories. 
However, the contemporary practice clearly shows the relevance of other groups that may 
potentially or arguably even currently claim their right to self-determination. United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (hereinafter – UNESCO) International 
Meeting of Experts on further study of the concept of the rights of peoples makes a valuable 
contribution here by listing in paragraph 22 of the final report and recommendations the criteria 
that characterize a homogeneous group as a “people”. These are, in particular, a common 
historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity, cultural or linguistic unity, religious or ideological 
affiliation, territorial connection or common economic conditions. What is more interesting, it 
is not even necessary for all the criteria to be met, it is said that only some would suffice.
34
 
Despite the aforementioned criteria being quite extensive but by no means exhaustive, the same 
document contains a certain disclaimer as well, stating that they bear the force of a soft law, not 
a binding definition.
35
 Nevertheless, the state practice nowadays implies the practical relevance 
of those criteria. It is even reasonable to expect a constant supplementation of characteristics 
that in the future might provide a clear legal definition enshrined in international statutory law 
of what a “people” is. For the purposes of this research, the concept of a people is applied 
within the meaning of the UNESCO document with a specific limitation of the boundary of a 
federal unit. 
There are more differing views on defining the concept of “people”. For instance, jurist Kelsen 
initiates a philosophy that “people” equate to “states” since the UN Charter is a piece of 
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legislation that regulates relations between states. However, this view is if not completely 
rejected, then definitely visibly extended by travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter, in which 
the preparatory committee stated that equality of rights was intended to apply to states, nations 
and peoples in the same manner.
36
 Similarly, reference to the above-mentioned excerpt from 
Resolution 2625 also clarifies that states have the obligation to refrain from denial of self-
determination. Beyond any doubt, this denotes a clear distinction between states as sovereigns 
and peoples as their subjects. 
2.3. External self-determination in the form of right to secession 
Furthermore, it is necessary to focus the attention on the very specific legal consequence that 
previously discussed peoples invoking self-determination are hoping for – the right to 
secession. As opposed to self-governance which involves a set of internal self-determination 
rights of all kinds required to be respected by the mother state, secession falls into the realm of 
external self-determination. It is widely held that theoretically in case of oppressions of such 
human rights the peoples acquire as the right to independence as a remedy.
37
 
2.3.1. De lege lata 
In order to determine to what extent right to secession is theoretical and how much legal force 
it currently carries it is first and foremost useful to examine the statutory law covering the 
issue. More specifically, two questions are important to be analysed: legality or permissibility 
of secession per se and the criteria for peoples to be met to qualify for secession. Legal 
framework for the purposes of this research is examined de lege lata. 
While the Resolution 1514 is generally quite sceptical about secession, in that it expressly 
condemns partial or total disruption of territorial integrity,
38
 there is yet another UN Resolution 
that covers the notion of secession extensively. The Resolution 2625 contains a declaration on 
principles that are necessary prerequisites for friendly relations among the states. By putting 
self-determination in e part of its preamble as one of the principles in an exhaustive list that 
requires progressive development and codification,
39
 the UN delimits exercise of state powers 
by according self-determination the status of jus cogens or a peremptory international norm. It 
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has accorded a special status to self-determination which renders it a peremptory norm of 
international law.
40
 
The foregoing argument that speaks about the peremptory nature of self-determination is by no 
means arbitrary. A case before the ICJ between Portugal and Australia concerning East Timor 
contains an important finding that self-determination is irreproachably an international erga 
omnes obligation, the existence of which does not in any way depend on lawfulness of the 
conduct of any state.
41
 On the basis of this judgment, it could therefore be inferred that state 
practice bears little significance if examined from a purely legal perspective, not in a political 
context. 
Arguably, the Resolution 2625 also imposes a significant exception to the highly praised 
territorial integrity in yet another way. Peculiarly enough, it expressly prohibits states to act 
against self-determination movements even if they strive for independence: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples 
referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
their right to self-determination and freedom and independence.
42 
However, a problem might be posed by the fact that the specific term of secession is never 
applied. Although “freedom and independence” practically means right for the peoples to 
secede, ambiguity of this provision and the excessively broad term of self-determination is 
interpreted to mean almost any discontent among the peoples regarding their mother state. 
Undoubtedly, the right to secession deserves its place in statutory international law, albeit 
merely between the lines. 
In sum, statutory law unfortunately does not provide clear explanation of the relevant terms and 
does not specify the conditions for secession. As can be concluded from the legal analysis it is 
due not to doubtful legality of secession but rather to lack of specific legal acts regulating the 
matter and the use of such broad terms in the existing acts that there are open to 
misinterpretation. Hence, it is necessary to resort to a slight application of normative 
philosophy. 
2.3.2. De lege ferenda 
Contemplations about de lege ferenda regarding the right to secession have received a valuable 
contribution from the work of Allen Buchanan. He believes that the framework of international 
institutions gives rise to institutional moral right for a group to secede defended by international 
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ethical norms.
43
 Such normative legal philosophy could provide a solid basis for further 
development of international legislation on secession. 
Buchanan proposes two theories of secession. The first is Primary Right Theory which permits 
secession on two legitimate grounds. On the first occasion, there has to be an ascriptive group 
the distinctiveness of which is defined by any other than political characteristics. Secondly, 
there may be an associative group which no matter how heterogeneous has to assert a right of 
political association and secede on grounds of voluntary political choice. Both cases, either 
apolitical or political are feasible on the merits of the group’s sole desire to secede.44 
The other theory is much more subtle and does not consider mere existence of group’s unity as 
a sufficient prerequisite for secession. Remedial Right Only Theory assumes that secession is 
legitimate if and only if violations of fundamental human rights are so unbearable that there is 
no other option than to exit. Buchanan distinguishes it from Locke’s theory of revolution by 
implying that the purpose of Remedial Right Only Theory is not to overthrow the government 
per se but to get rid from its oppressive control over a certain part of territory.
45
 This more 
restrictive theory can be successfully supplemented by Amandine Catala’s “just cause theory” 
of remedial secession. She adds two elements for the arousal of claim to remedial secession: 
disregard of its political legitimacy by the mother state and failure thereby to ensure provision 
of justice.
46
 
Since the current research examines in detail self-determination in the specific external form of 
secession, the author finds it relevant to analyse the current international practice of secession 
through the lens of integral “remedial” element. International human rights law does not permit 
explicitly secession per se, it leaves lacunae for legal remedy for gross human rights violations. 
Therefore, the following chapters are focused on circumstances constituting secession as 
remedial in the current state practice. 
CHAPTER 2: EXISTING STATE PRACTICE ON REMEDIAL SECESSION  
3. EX FACTIS JUS ORITUR – A GAP-FILLING INSTRUMENT 
To begin with, the extreme incompleteness of international legal regulation in the matter of 
secession gives rise to a thought that factual background may legitimize such right. The 
proposition can be affirmed by the ever-existing relationship between two international legal 
principles: ex injuria jus non oritur (hereinafter ex injuria) and ex factis jus oritur (hereinafter 
ex factis). The latter maxim by its nature can be considered a remedy, since it implies that law 
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arises from facts,
47
 in the case of human rights law meaning the respective wrongdoings by 
states. In sum, facts rather than law legitimize remedial secession. This principle is crucial not 
for generating remedial circumstances in a complete absence of violations of actually existing 
laws but rather for filling in the previously mentioned gaps in law regarding the way in which 
such violations shall be remedied. 
Moreover, the abundance of lacunae in the norms prescribing self-determination even proves 
the objective necessity to evaluate each case in the account of factual circumstances. The 
international environment in its weakest places experiences demonstration of superior power of 
states taking the duty of legislating the ambiguous matters.  Already back in 1951 the scholar T. 
Cheng correctly noted that where the authority of international law is the most minimal, 
establishing the scope of ex factis as a social force is the only way to counterbalance the actual 
display of disruptive forces.
48
 As to sovereigns who legislate at the expense of rights of their 
units, the maxim is even more relevant as a remedy against the abuse of delegated power at the 
federal level. 
Nevertheless, ex factis is unfortunately no less ambiguous than statutory international law. 
Despite the undeniable importance of this maxim, its application has to be carried out narrowly. 
While ex injuria is presumed to eliminate injustice, ex factis should provide a safeguard against 
disorder.
49
 Illustrative evidence of the application of ex factis is present in state practice in the 
case of independence of the Baltic States in 1991. While ex injuria would mean secession from 
the Soviet Union as a result of its dissolution, ex factis was the actual principle under which the 
independence was rather to be restored than secession exercised. It essentially means that 
determination of status of the Baltic States was dependent upon the factual circumstances of 
that time.
50
 Further elaborating upon Cheng’s considerations, it has been rightly concluded that 
ex factis as a social force carries the risk of law being used to attain the desired social ends.
51
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In this specific issue the ICJ held in paragraph 91 of its judgment in South West Africa cases 
that in the process of application of teleological interpretation to the international law “rights 
cannot be presumed to exist merely because it might seem desirable that they should”.52 Hence, 
rectification of international law has to be very limited and subject to strict case-specific factual 
conditions for ex factis to be regarded as a legal instrument. State practice and in particular 
federal practice is thereby a reference point for examining the existence of customary law in the 
form of remedial secession given these conditions. 
4. CIRCUMSTANCES CONSTITUTING REMEDIAL SECESSION  
4.1. Bangladesh 
Analysis of state practice is applied to clarify what “remedial” part of right to secession 
involves and subsequently to establish the existence of customary law. A scholar Ieva 
Vezbergaite suggest that Bangladesh should be demonstrated as the cornerstone of analysis of 
remedial secession because as a geographically separate province called East Pakistan it 
managed to secede from Pakistan in 1971 outside the meaning of colonial-self-determination 
and form an independent state. Beyond any doubt, fundamental human rights violations as a 
phenomenon present on an illustratively large-scale
53
 is by no means underestimated. 
4.1.1. Qualification for the right to secession 
First and foremost, Bengalis as inhabitants of East Pakistan possess the right to secession due 
to absence of any means to exclude them from notion of the term “people”. Besides being 
geographically separated, Bengalis are according to a Study of Secular and Religious Frontiers 
considered a culturally, linguistically and religiously distinct group not only within the borders 
of Pakistan, but also the subcontinent in general.
54
 It is clear that strong-multifaceted cohesion 
is prevalent within this group that qualifies them as “people” that have been afforded collective 
rights. 
Secondly, aspiration of Bengalis towards unilateral independence is by no means arbitrary. 
Given the rough division of Pakistan into ideologically separate West and East Pakistan, 
internal tensions intensified due to concentration of economic and political power in the 
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former.
55
 Here, it is necessary to examine the provisions of Pakistani federal constitutional law 
at the time of 1962 to detect existence of any imbalance. It is important to note that article one 
expressly puts forward the provinces of West and East Pakistan as the only constituent units of 
the federation and other territories that “[…] are or may become included in Pakistan, whether 
by accession or otherwise”.56 This means prima facie that any territory is not afforded the same 
status, given that other constituent territories are not even listed. 
Looking more specifically at the provisions on governance in the country, part four of the 
Constitution called “The Provinces” prescribes the legislative and judicial system for West and 
East Pakistan. Although it may seem that at least these two principal provinces should have 
equal separation of powers, a discrepancy appears in article 97 that covers “The High Courts” 
system. While the first and second paragraph of this article envisages in an equal manner 
permanent seats for the High Court in both provinces, the third paragraph states that: 
A Judge of the High Court of the Province of West Pakistan shall not be transferred 
from a permanent seat of that Court to another permanent seat of that Court without 
the approval of the President first being obtained […].57 
Peculiarly, there is no provision in the Constitution that would prohibit transfer of a judge to 
another seat without a specific approval on the part of East Pakistan. A conclusion follows that 
courts of West Pakistan have more judicial power since they are under an intensified scrutiny 
of the president. This means that even in legal terms East Pakistan is facing discriminatory 
treatment since there are more stringent judicial requirements than in West Pakistan. The 
obvious imbalance clearly breaches the principles of democracy, freedom and equality 
mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution.
58
 Certain abuse of federal power is also present 
which means that politically right to secession for East Pakistan is justified. 
Interestingly enough, preamble of the Constitution contains the following wording: “Pakistan 
should be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of social justice”.59 The allegedly 
restrictive federal law therefore makes a reference to ex factis principle very explicitly, in 
essence stating that justice is by its nature a social phenomenon. However, the Constitution 
does not lean towards permitting secession. Ineptitude with the principle of social justice is 
visible again in the third part of the preamble stipulating that the provinces shall be “enjoying 
such autonomy as is consistent with the unity and interest of Pakistan as a whole”.60 
Indisputably, secession would distort the unity and most likely be against the interest of 
Pakistan as a federal sovereign. Inconsistency among the different principles of Constitution is 
due to excessive centralization of federal power for which further a remedy has to be provided. 
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4.1.2. Existence of “remedial” circumstances 
Disregarding even the presence of political inequality among the provinces which due to 
respect of territorial integrity may not be acknowledged a valid ground for secession, a strong 
“remedial” element is prevalent. The most important argument that can be put forward is 
massive perpetration of human rights violations on three different levels. As a matter of fact, 
each type on its own expressly calls for the abused people to secede, while together they 
reinstitute legality of remedial secession. 
The first level concerns breach of cultural, linguistic, political and social rights of Bengali 
people. An illustrative instance of violation is subversion of Bengali language by not 
recognizing it as official, although more than 50% of Pakistan’s population natively spoke 
Bengali. In addition, leadership of the country was mostly non-Bengali, leaving a strong sense 
of underrepresentation in East Pakistan. The language recognition movements were constantly 
rejected and even suppressed by police force. The ethnic composition of Pakistani government 
accordingly also left Bengalis relatively politically disenfranchised.
61
 
In economic terms similarly, East Pakistan was receiving a significantly lower share of 
government expenditures since industrialization was aimed at West Pakistan. Hence, the 
largely agrarian East Pakistan was regarded merely as a junior economic partner of West 
Pakistan and overall faced a certain kind of “inter-regional colonialism”.62 Before even coming 
to international human rights law, such treatment of constituent peoples breaches federal 
constitutional guarantees in Pakistan, for in the third part of preamble of the Constitution, point 
e, it is emphasized that respect should be paid for: “the fundamental human rights (including 
the rights of equality before law, […], of social, economic and political justice)”.63 
Unsurprisingly, disregard of federal constitutional rights in this case is yet the mildest form of 
human rights violations. What follows on the second level is summarized successfully by a 
scholar Zuzana Žaludova. Claiming that all the available options for realization of rights for 
Bengali people were exhausted, it can be inferred that internationally accepted and recognized 
right to internal self-determination was denied.
64
 This is yet another legitimate ground for 
remedially seceding from the oppressive federal sovereign. 
Finally, the third level violations provide the most convincing argument for remedial secession. 
Outrageous atrocities were perpetrated by the federal sovereign against the independence 
movement initiated by the Awami League who won the representation rights of East Pakistan 
in the elections of 1971.
65
 The peaceful movement was violently suppressed by Pakistani 
military junta in a specifically targeted Operation Searchlight, exterminating the cultural 
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activists, students, teachers who participated. Different newspapers suggest that federal 
violence was so widespread that it is not even possible to evaluate the number of casualties 
which ranged approximately from 10’000 to 35’000.66 
There is hardly any reason to rebut the right to remedial secession under these circumstances. 
Bengali people themselves acknowledge in the proclamation of independence of April 10, 
1971, that independence of their country is a “due fulfilment of the legitimate right of self-
determination of the people of Bangladesh”.67 Moreover, it is important to note that the 
aforementioned document does not declare independence on its own merits. It makes a relevant 
reference to the twofold ultimate reason for secession. On the one hand it concerns denial of a 
right to internal self-determination: 
[…] the Pakistan Government by levying an unjust war and committing genocide and 
by other repressive measures made it impossible for the elected representatives of the 
people of Bangladesh to meet and frame a Constitution, and give to themselves a 
Government.
68 
Thus, federal repression is a circumstance that requires a remedy. On the other hand, there is an 
even more substantial circumstance also mentioned in the proclamation of independence that 
implies the only feasible remedy to the foregoing violations is secession: 
[…] in the conduct of a ruthless and savage war the Pakistani authorities committed 
and are still continuously committing numerous acts of genocide and unprecedented 
tortures, amongst others on the civilian and unarmed people of Bangladesh.
69
 
This means that fundamental human rights enshrined in UDHR and ICCPR have been 
expressly neglected by the federal sovereign. A term that deserves a special attention here is 
“genocide”. If that is even possible, it underlines the necessity for remedial secession even 
more. 
In the writings of international doctrine it is also common to notice Liberation war in 
Bangladesh being compared by analogy to the crime of genocide, not simply falling within the 
meaning of “civil war” or “war of independence”.70 This circumstance clearly aggravates the 
seriousness of oppression by the federal sovereign. Moreover, it even falls under the 
international humanitarian law, as there is a dispute between Pakistan and India brought before 
the ICJ regarding the punishment of war criminals in the situation regarding Bangladesh, in 
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which the Genocide Convention was invoked as the legal basis for the first time before the 
ICJ.
71
 In particular, 
[…] one hundred and ninety-five Pakistani nationals or any other number, now in 
Indian custody [are] accused of committing acts of genocide in Pakistani territory,
72 
the last notion being applied to East Pakistan, since Pakistan objects to extradition of these 
nationals by stating that “India would act illegally in transferring such persons to "Bangla 
Desh" for trial”.73 Despite Pakistan obviously objecting to transfer of jurisdiction, the fact that 
it admits perpetration of war crimes by itself reaffirms existence of circumstances that qualify 
as remedial and henceforth the right to secede under these circumstances. 
4.1.3. Carte blanche case of remedial secession 
While it has previously been concluded that remedial secession is a fluid international concept 
if legal at all, from the case-study of Bangladesh it should be inferred that it possesses a status 
of a full-fledged and absolutely legitimate right. The reason for such inference is that several 
strong criteria are being put forward to clarify the concept of “remedy” in this context. These 
are: denial of internal self-determination, infringement of fundamental rights enshrined in the 
federal constitutional law, breach of international human rights law of such extent that it 
already falls within the realm of humanitarian law. Additionally, the people invoking remedial 
secession have to constitute a fully cohesive group, have made peaceful expressions of will for 
independence and be considered as a federal unit within the meaning of federal constitution. 
Given the peculiar circumstances of the Bangladesh case-study, scholars recognize it could be 
afforded a separate term: humanitarian secession. It stems from a complete impossibility to 
resolve an irreversible scale of human rights violations.
74
 After all, with theoretically any 
remedy completely absent for remedying the intolerable injustices suffered by the people, 
literally the only way out is secession. 
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4.2. South Carolina 
4.2.1. Secession as a means to preserve a constitutional right 
Bangladesh being analysed as an exemplary case-study of the criteria necessary to legitimize 
remedial secession at first hand, the next step is to elaborate further in detail upon the 
circumstances in which remedial secession could have crystallized as customary law. Secession 
of South Carolina depicts yet another peculiar case-study from the legal perspective. Although 
the events evolving around its secession took place in the 19
th
 century, in the process of 
establishing existence of customary law regarding this issue the case is nevertheless legally 
relevant. Perhaps this is even due to the fact that the secession movement was highly 
politicized. 
As difficult as it may seem from the contemporary perspective to apprehend the core reason of 
secession, but its nature was rough: slavery. In view of the political abolitionist movements 
during the 1850s, South Carolinians felt an existential threat to their political system, since 90% 
of population of South Carolina was Afro-American but the government – a slave-holding 
oligarchy.
75
 As rudimentary as it may seem, for the purposes of this analysis slaveholding is to 
be understood as a constitutional right. 
From the moment the states forming USA decided to unite, freedom and independence were 
considered the fundamental rights. It is vividly enshrined in the Declaration of Independence of 
1776: “these united colonies are and ought to be free and independent states.”76 Furthermore, 
the explicit constitutional right to hold slaves was provided by the Constitution at the time in 
article four, section two: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping 
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged 
from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom 
such Service or Labour may be due.
77
 
Accordingly, abolition of slavery is clearly a disregard of constitutional safeguard to the 
detriment of federal subunits for which this right is crucial. It can thus be inferred that 
existential threat to welfare and functioning of the state is also a circumstance justifying 
remedial secession. 
Therefore, South Carolina case is somewhat similar to that of Bangladesh: both secessions are 
invoked on the basis of breach of rights. What logically follows is South Carolina’s retreat from 
its obligations under the federal law of USA included in the Declaration of the Immediate 
Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union: 
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the constituted compact has been deliberately broken and disregarded by the non-
slaveholding States, and the consequence follows that South Carolina is released from 
her obligation.
78
 
To the contrary, there has been another political discourse on the part of the government that 
southern states as a whole have begun to run the country by their slaveholding oligarchy, as 
opposed to northern states who begun to lose that power.
79
 A conclusion that follows is that this 
case-study presents another form of abuse of federal power by the sovereign. 
4.2.2. State continuity 
What even worsens the breach of a constitutional right, thus quite reasonably helping South 
Carolina’s secession to meet the requirements for qualifying as “remedial” is the breach of 
doctrine of state continuity by US as a federal sovereign. At this point, the analysis of South 
Carolina case and its respective circumstances of remedial secession needs to be performed in a 
more generalized framework. The reason for such generalization lies in the special character of 
the federal states’ obligations towards their federal units. In this regard, the scholar Krystyna 
Marek upholds the important notion of state identity that, in her opinion, has crystallized in the 
contemporary public international law. 
More specifically, K. Marek notes that state identity is the total of its rights and obligations 
under both customary and statutory international law. The exercise of rights and respect for 
obligations thereof adds the temporal element of state continuity to the notion of state identity. 
She then logically concludes that state continuity is a mandatory dynamic predicate for a state 
to possess legal identity at all.
80
 It would further be valid to assert that the doctrine of state 
continuity is particularly relevant for federal states concerning respect for their obligations 
towards partially autonomous subunits. Hence, the case of South Carolina may be demonstrated 
as an illustrative example of the US failing to comply with this doctrine. 
With the slaveholding right standing at the fore of South Carolina’s secession, it is equally legit 
to refer to the more general obligation of the US as a federal sovereign embodied in the section 
four of article four of the Original constitution: 
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion.
81 
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The key term that is of interest in this particular provision is the “invasion”. While open to 
interpretation in a wide sense, it definitely bears the ultimate aim of preservation of the extent 
of autonomy the federal units are allowed to retain. By letting each unit to form its own 
government, the federal sovereign recognizes an obligation of non-interference. Preamble of 
the Original constitution further lays down a basis for an agreement upon which the units 
initially decided to form their sovereign: 
[…] to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to [them]selves and [their] Posterity […].82 
The mention of a number of fundamental values in the preamble is indicative of the basic 
threshold the previously mentioned “invasion” may not be directed against. 
Hence, South Carolina’s autonomy having suffered from invasion upon a constitutional 
slaveholding right complemented by the more general rights to maintain welfare and liberty 
even if that meant using serfdom as an appropriate means secession is justified as remedial. If 
the very constitutional foundation of the US is perceived as an agreement made by the federal 
units, it can be inferred that anti-slavery policies implemented by the federal sovereign and 
the northern states undermined the terms agreed upon, thus discharging South Carolina from 
its respective obligations.
83
 After all, it does not have to bear the burden of its obligations 
before the sovereign if, as suggested by the judge Ineta Ziemele, due to drastic changes the 
federal state has ceased to exist as the same state, thereby violating state continuity.
84
 As a 
natural consequence, secession may be considered as a remedy for the contractual breach. 
Overall, South Carolina’s secession bears a number of similar features in comparison with 
Bangladesh. On one hand, fundamental constitutional rights were breached in both cases, 
simultaneously clearly infringing upon the fundamental values prescribed by international 
human rights law. While Bangladesh illustrates an exemplary remedial situation with the 
violations present thereby so grave that they even qualify as humanitarian, South Carolina 
arguably adds yet another no less important criterion to be met in order for remedial secession 
to be legitimately invoked. In fact, it further narrows down the scope of remedial secession 
because its essence focuses rather on the federal sovereign itself: the state authority has to 
experience changes so drastic that it can no longer be regarded as the same state. 
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4.3. Chechnya 
4.3.1. Conditional independence 
The next case-study that could prove to be a fertile soil for finding indications of customary 
law for remedial secession is Chechnya. Chechen grievances might be traced back to 1940s 
when Stalin’s policies of collectivization turned to the finest urban cities of the region Grozny 
and Nazran making them the primary suppliers of refined oil and motor fuel to the whole 
USSR with Chechen-Ingush Republic having been left prey to marginalization and poverty 
unemployment rate of 59%, while the same indicator being merely 27% in the USSR in 
general.
85
 Unsurprisingly, having faced such severe discrimination and economic exploitation 
nearly equal to violations of social rights in Bangladesh, Chechens employed the chance to 
“take as much sovereignty as [they] can stomach”86 at the time of Gorbachev’s popular appeal 
in 1990 to Russia’s ethnic republics. 
However, Chechnya’s case is not peculiar merely due to the two long secessionist wars from 
1994 to 1999 and from 1999 to present which have commonly been denoted as graveyards of 
human rights witnessing violations that disputably even amounted to ethnic cleansing and 
genocide.
87
 Its path of exercising remedial secession bears a seemingly democratic 
component – a referendum – that, as paradoxical as it may seem, arguably adds one more 
remedial circumstance. Although under Putin’s initiative in 2003 a referendum on the issue of 
ratification of a new constitution was designed to grant Chechnya a considerably wider 
autonomy while still being an integral part of Russian Federation, independent experts deeply 
question the legitimacy of its results which show 80% of voter turnout and 96% of votes in 
favour of the constitution.
88
 What the current president of the Chechen Republic Ramzan 
Kadyrov notes is that the referendum can be considered as a tool for preserving Russia’s 
integrity once and for all.
89
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The commonly denoted “conditional independence” 90 that is claimed to have been established 
in Chechnya through the referendum can certainly be considered a denial of the right to 
secession. What reaffirms presence of a remedial circumstance is conjunction of the 
referendum with the constant human rights violations during the armed conflicts in Chechnya. 
Hence, each of these aspects are necessary to be examined to specify the nuances Chechnya 
case brings to determination of customary law regarding remedial secession. 
4.3.2. Internal self-determination: a preventative measure 
In the context of Chechnya case, it is crucial to distinguish between external and internal self-
determination and the relevant interconnection thereof. External determination is touched by 
the secession in a direct way. To begin with, the issue of secession per se is quite 
unambiguously settled in Russian federal constitutional law. In particular, chapter three of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation which establishes the federal structure of the country, 
firstly, lists in article 65 both Chechen Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia as constituent 
federal subjects of the Russian Federation and further contains an article which explicitly puts 
forward provisions for determination of status of such federal subjects.
91
 Specifically, part 
five of article 66 maintains that: 
The status of a subject of the Russian Federation may be changed upon mutual 
agreement of the Russian Federation and the subject of the Russian Federation and 
according to the federal constitutional law.
92
 
The rule enshrined in this provision leaves no doubt as to whether secession of federal 
subjects is permissible under Russian federal constitutional law as long as it is coordinated 
with the federal sovereign. Although referendum may indeed in this particular case be 
considered a point of mutual consent between the sovereign and its subjects, conditionality of 
independence it grants to the republics is an outright violation of the right to external self-
determination. At this point, the linkage turns smoothly to internal self-determination. 
Initiation of a referendum with the ultimate aim of imposing a constitution that obliges 
Chechnya to remain under the sovereignty of the Russian Federation even if to a limited 
extent can reasonably be perceived as a measure tailored to prevent secession by the means of 
establishing a special status of internal self-determination.
93
  
Restrictive nature of the referendum is also proven by taking a glance at the Declaration on 
sovereignty of Chechen-Ingush Republic of 1999. The very first article of this document 
places Chechen-Ingush Republic as a sovereign state created as a result of self-determination 
of Chechen and Ingush peoples. Moreover, it underlines that sovereignty is a natural and 
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necessary precondition for the existence of statehood of Chechen-Ingush Republic.
94
 
Nevertheless, what the aforementioned referendum strives for is devolution of power to the 
federal subject in a manner that puts such conditions to Chechnya’s sovereignty as never to 
exercise its external self-determination.  
Remedial secession as an exercise of external self-determination can be held as practically 
non-existing under Russian federal constitutional law. Such inference is illustrated by the 
Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 31 July 1995 on the 
constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees and the Resolutions of the Federal Government 
concerning the situation in Chechnya: 
The exercise of the right to self-determination should not be construed as sanctioning 
or encouraging any acts leading to the dismemberment or complete disruption of 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign independent States acting pursuant to 
the principle of equality and self-determination of nations.
95
 
Given the obvious lack of constitutional regulation on the procedure and mechanisms for 
altering the status of federal subjects in Russia,
96
 remedial secession is sought to be replaced 
by every attempt from the side of the federal sovereign. 
The argument here is that allowing the Chechen and Ingush peoples to exercise their right to 
internal self-determination in a manner pre-determined by the federal sovereign is the 
beginning point for denial of any further attempt of external self-determination as well. 
Although the Constitution in article 69 firmly upholds respect for the rights of the indigenous 
small peoples in accordance with international principles,
97
 the wording appears to be a nearly 
empty phrase. 
4.4. Kosovo  
The discussion around the lawfulness of right to remedial secession inevitably leads to the 
case of Kosovo. Being considered as a sui generis case of secession, it reveals a large number 
of remedial circumstances that arguably constitute an “authoritative precedent”.98 Given the 
complicated background of the case, as well as the abundance of legal issues present, a 
framework of what a customary rule on remedial secession involves may be established. 
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4.4.1. Forced harmonization 
The uneasy 1990s the signalling event of which was the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a matter 
of fact gave rise to numerous secession movements, similarly as the case of Chechnya and the 
Soviet Union. Although a commonly shared view in the academic discourse evolves around 
secessions being the cause and root of armed conflicts, in the case of Yugoslavia, it can be 
contended that unionist attempts directly contributed to the disaster that certainly required 
secession as a remedy.
99
 Sonja Biserko, the president of the Helsinki Committee for Human 
Rights in Serbia made an important point in her speech of 2012 at the Third Annual Humanity 
in Action International Conference in Sarajevo. In particular, she noted that in the wake of 
consecutive emancipations of Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, Montenegrins and Macedonians, 
the remnants of Yugoslavia essentially formed an “extended Serbia” which despite 
Yugoslavia having always been a federal state rejected any perspective of existing further as a 
union of equal states.
100
 
Ms. Biserko’s point is relevant for the reason it hints at one of the most early-stage remedial 
circumstances of this case. It may be called deprivation of equality for the former federal 
subjects. This circumstance is evidenced by comparison of the constitutions of Yugoslavia 
and Serbia as its successor. The very first article of the Constitution of Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia establishes a federal sovereign comprised of equal subjects: 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be a sovereign federal state, founded on the 
equality of citizens and the equality of its member republics.
101
 
To the contrary, the important legal principle of equality before law has certainly been 
removed in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia which superseded the Yugoslav federal 
constitutional law. The wording of article four exemplifies this argument: 
The territory of the Republic of Serbia is a single whole, no part of which may be 
alienated. Any change in the boundaries of the Republic of Serbia shall be decided 
upon by the citizens in a referendum.
102
 
The particular provision deserves a special emphasis since it bears the first reflection of the 
sui generis nature of Kosovo case. Defederalization here implies deterioration of fundamental 
rights accorded to the federal subjects, since formation of a unitary state of Serbia expressly 
prohibits secession. Thus, lack of federally provided autonomy may also prove to be a 
remedial circumstance, albeit under restrictive conditions. More specifically, concentration of 
power of state authority has to be implemented at an unequivocal expense of autonomy 
dispersed among the federal subjects. From the article six of the Constitution of Serbia it is 
visible that the sole autonomy left to the federal subjects is mere separation into the three 
                                                          
99
 Daniel Kofman, “Secession, Law, and Rights: The Case of the Former Yugoslavia”, Human Rights Review, 
2000, p. 9. Available on: EBSCO host. Accessed March 25, 2018. 
100
 Sonja Biserko, “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Roots of the Conflict”. Humanity in Action. Available on: 
https://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/360-the-dissolution-of-yugoslavia-roots-of-the-conflict. 
Accessed April 30, 2018. 
101
 Yugoslavia. The Constitution of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (April 27, 1992). Available on: 
http://www.cecl.gr/RigasNetwork/databank/Constitutions/Yugoslavia.html. Accessed April 30, 2018. 
102
 Serbia. The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. (September 28, 1990). Available on: 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan019071.pdf. Accessed April 30, 2018. 
32 
 
 
 
provinces of Voivodina, Metohia and Kosovo, “these being the forms of territorial 
autonomy”.103 
Thus, before even exploring the absence or presence of internal self-determination, it appears 
that federal subjects as autonomous entities face political or legal inequality. The remedial 
circumstance arises therefore not factually from the violations of fundamental rights and 
principles prescribed by the constitution. It is pervasive in the federal constitutional law itself. 
4.4.2. External intervention 
Another sui generis element is presented by the NATO intervention in the humanitarian crisis 
that unrolled in Kosovo following the constitutional alteration of Kosovo’s autonomy. Facts 
of the case being similar to those of Bangladesh case, during the secession movements in 
1998, over 1’500 Kosovar Albanians, the predominant ethnicity in Kosovo, were killed by 
Serbian police and military forces, and around 400’000 were forced to flee.104 Needless to 
evaluate the human rights violations separately, for discrimination of ethnic group of peoples 
was present in a manner similar to that of Bangladesh or Chechnya case, and internal self-
determination was also denied as in the case of Bangladesh. 
What proves to be a remedial circumstance in this case is indeed not a mere violation of 
human rights if this might be formulated so. The gravity of atrocities perpetrated against the 
people of Kosovo amounts to a threat to international peace and security expressed in the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244 which: 
demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and 
verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable 
phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces 
according to a rapid timetable.
105
 
In the sequel, remedial secession is an indisputably legitimate right when the aggregation of 
remedial circumstances poses a direct grave concern to the international community itself. 
The issue does not even concern the unlawful alteration of political and legal status of 
Kosovo. It rather touches upon the subsequent treatment of the Kosovo people. Judge 
Cançado Trindade suggests in this regard that the systematic oppression of Kosovar 
Albanians can be said to have been exercised in such a scale that Serbia as a state forfeited its 
unjust privilege over them, thus validating the right to remedial secession.
106
 
An important issue that seems to be left open is the unprecedented nature of Kosovo’s 
secession. The people of Kosovo undoubtedly perceive their independence as “a special case 
arising from Yugoslavia's non-consensual breakup [which] is not a precedent for any other 
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situation”107 according to the exact wording of the Kosovo’s declaration of independence. 
Most likely, the reason for such perception of uniqueness is combination of the factors of 
forceful harmonization of political power by Serbia and international institutional supervision 
thereof which accompanied the process of liberation: 
Grateful that in 1999 the world intervened, thereby removing Belgrade's governance 
over Kosovo and placing Kosovo under United Nations interim administration.
108
 
However, it would be legit to assume that the term “unprecedented” in the Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence is applied out of pomposity rather than legal relevance. Besides 
the external intervention, there are hardly any remedial circumstances entirely uncommon. 
Nevertheless, a moment which deserves more attention is Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence carried out in a disregard of the internationally taken action. 
4.4.3. Unilateral declaration of independence 
Ex factis framework adds another legal issue to the evaluation of remedial circumstances in 
Kosovo since despite cherishing the feelings of deep gratitude towards the international 
community for its intervention, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence on 17 February, 
2008, contravening the crisis solution adopted in the Resolution 1244.
109
 Whereas the 
referendum of 1991 convened by an underground parliament of Kosovar Albanians on the 
issue of Kosovo’s independence110 may be legally justified under article four of the Serbian 
constitution which in a way permits such democratic expressions, the actual declaration of 
independence by no means falls under this constitutional provision. 
From the Resolution 1244 it is unambiguous that concrete steps and working guidelines were 
set out for resolving the crisis situation. It contains a reference to the internationally 
established interim government in Kosovo as well: 
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo.
111
 
Hence, it logically follows that Kosovo breached also one of the basic provisions of the 
Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (hereinafter 
Constitutional Framework) which has directly been intended as the remedy for the detrimental 
change of political status of Kosovo as an autonomous province: 
Kosovo is an undivided territory throughout which the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government established by this Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government (Constitutional Framework) shall exercise their responsibilities.
112
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Apparently, exercise of Kosovo people’s right to remedial secession has been on the expense 
of an already existing remedy. Despite the dubious acceptance of international assistance and 
compliance with its terms by the Kosovo people, there seems to still exist a remedial 
circumstance. The ICJ has implied in paragraph 105 of its advisory opinion on the 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect 
of Kosovo (hereinafter Advisory Opinion) that: 
The declaration of independence reflects the awareness of its authors that the final 
status negotiations had failed and that a critical moment for the future of Kosovo had 
been reached.
113
 
Such inference by the international judicial authority clearly means that if the crisis situation 
is of such nature that international assistance fails to be satisfactory, unilateral actions may be 
legitimated. The fact that the ICJ admitted eventually in paragraph 122 of its Advisory 
Opinion that neither general international law, nor Resolution 1244 or the Constitutional 
Framework has been violated by the adoption of the declaration
114
 sets out the presence of a 
remedial circumstance in the case of inadequacy of existing remedies, as paradoxical as it 
may seem. 
Having made this conclusion, it is regretful to notice that the ICJ did not rule generally on the 
right to secession. Although it clearly emphasized, that Kosovo’s secession was not prohibited 
given the remedial circumstances present, it did not recognize existence of a customary rule 
authorizing remedial secession.
115
 From the available facts, the Kosovo case suggests that 
remedial secession is legitimate under the circumstances of deprivation of political and legal 
autonomy, previously mentioned denial of internal self-determination, perpetration of human 
rights violations on a scale that amounts to a humanitarian crisis and inadequacy of any 
remedies present at a time. 
CHAPTER 3 : EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDIAL SECESSION IN PRACTICE  
5. UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT 
The  highly theoretical contemplations about contentious international legal issues, for 
instance the legality of remedial secession under such restrictive circumstances as in the cases 
of Bangladesh, South Carolina, Chechnya, Kosovo not contributing much to the process of 
finding a real solution, the issue of what is the practical relevance of a legal right arises. It is 
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not therefore sufficient to establish that having met stringent legal criteria or having 
experienced circumstances exemplified by the relevant state practice a people may 
legitimately invoke their right to remedial secession by relying on it as a customary rule. Mere 
legality does not automatically entail subsequent effectiveness. The next important argument 
is thus that remedial secession may only truly be considered a customary rule when it is 
effective for the state it has provided independence. 
The argument is hidden in the interstices of the ICJ interpretation of international law. It has 
been found by the scholars that opinions and judgments of the ICJ, as well as authorizations 
by the UN to exercise certain functions or powers are all based on the maxim ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat (hereinafter principle of effectiveness) that envisages a utilitarian approach 
based on the evaluation of effectiveness.
116
 Since the only case where authorization by the UN 
to implement a political solution was Kosovo, it may be concluded in favour of the Kosovo 
secession, that the remedy provided in the form of interim government was not effective. 
However, the principle of effectiveness is not confined to the realm of activities by the 
international decision-making bodies. Where it is directly applicable to all the cases 
mentioned above is treaty law, more specifically speaking about Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (hereinafter VCLT). It has been suggested that the principle of effectiveness 
in the process of interpretation remedies the silence of law regarding an issue.
117
 Given the 
unclear legal status of remedial secession, this might be the right case. Accordingly, article 
31, part one maintains: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.
118
 
This in essence means that interpretation of the human rights documents is subject to ordinary 
interpretation. Although the article does not expressly state principle of effectiveness as the 
guiding maxim, from its conservative wording it should be clear that only decolonization 
would be accorded the ordinary meaning of the term self-determination as a settled and 
unquestionable legal matter. 
However, there fortunately is a gap left for remedial secession to squeeze in. The third part of 
the same article puts forward in point b that account should be taken of: 
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Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.
119
 
Since remedial secession does not deserve an express mention in the international statutory 
law, its legality is found in state practice that forms international customary law. Beyond any 
doubt, state practice regarding self-determination and, more specifically, remedial secession, 
may be considered application of a treaty by subsequent practice. Hence, an argument could 
be put forward that effective application of treaty thereof renders remedial secession effective 
as such. 
Despite the principle of effectiveness not being explicitly set out in the VCLT, its importance 
should not be underestimated. When taking a glimpse at the preparatory work of the 
International Law Commission carried out for the VCLT, an interesting proposal by the 
Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock deserves attention. He holds that articles 70 and 
71 of VCLT that cover the consequences of invalidity and termination of treaties
120
 shall be 
interpreted as to give the fullest weight to the treaty provisions in accordance with the natural 
and ordinary meaning, as well as the objectives and purposes of a treaty.
121
 Hence, before the 
states decided to dismantle their obligation to respect self-determination, a due diligence 
process would have to be carried out to meet the requirements of effectiveness. 
While it may seem that travaux preparatoires bear no legal significance at all, VCLT itself 
affords them a special place after the general rule of interpretation. In this regard, article 32 
provides: 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31.
122
 
Although the wording is mild and states only that supplementary means may be resorted to in 
case of necessity, it is only logical that “ambiguous” and “obscure” meanings, as well as 
“manifestly absurd” and “unreasonable”123 results do not leave any option other than finding 
the principle of effectiveness in the travaux preparatoires and arguably also the interstices of 
VCLT text per se. Thus, it can be inferred that the law of treaties indirectly prevents states 
from arbitrary denial of right to remedial secession, provided the ad hoc circumstances render 
it effective. 
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6. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STATEHOOD 
In an ascending scale of importance, a more prevalent directly related to the effectiveness is 
the qualification of statehood. The noble discussions around existence of a remedial right to 
secession mean literally nothing in practice if the newly independent states are not able to 
exercise their statehood. It has to be proven that remedial secession goes beyond the 
normative theoretical realm. 
In this regard, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (hereinafter 
Montevideo Convention) proves to be useful in defining statehood. Particularly, it puts 
forwards four criteria in its very first article: a permanent population,  a defined territory, 
a government and the capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
124
 While the states 
of case studies at hand obviously do not experience difficulties meeting the former three, the 
latter deserves special attention. 
The capacity to conduct relations with other states implies acceptance of it as an international 
legal subject. Thus, or the remedial secession to qualify as effective, it is not even sufficient to 
meet the statehood criteria. The new state has to conform to the “policy of recognition”125. 
The law of recognition currently evolves in two schools of thought: consecutive and 
declaratory. While the latter holds that a state acquires statehood at the moment it acquires 
marks of a state, the former strictly poses a requirement of recognition by the other states as 
the integral criterion of statehood.
126
 The Montevideo Convention is ambivalent on this 
matter. It states in article three: 
The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. 
Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and 
independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to 
organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and 
to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.
127 
It is clear that a state has to possess all the three criteria to qualify for statehood. As to 
recognition, however, it appears that it adds legal personality to the state. While it may exist 
as a political entity, it may bear no practical relevance in the conduct of international 
relations. The problem is visible in the Kosovo case, a country which has been recognized by 
114 other states but still lacks recognition of its former oppressor Serbia and such important 
international actor as Russia.
128
 Thus, its effectiveness as a state-like entity is at best limited. 
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While politically it has regained its status in a form of independence, the legal status is not 
very clear and thus does not permit to assert the rights of a state to the fullest extent. 
7. STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
The last point that is relevant for examination in view of remedial secession is state 
responsibility. An argument that can be made here is that commission of internationally 
wrongful acts by states adds yet another remedial circumstance for invoking right to secession 
and aggravates the magnitude of human rights violations present in a particular case. As seen 
from the cases of Bangladesh and Kosovo especially, presence of a humanitarian crisis was 
one of the decisive elements that legitimated secession. It has therefore been lately contended 
that the breach of humanitarian law composed of massive human rights violation occasions 
fall within the realm of traditional inter-state relations, for which state responsibility must be 
applied.
129
 
The specific remedial circumstance arises out of failure to comply with the peremptory norms 
envisaged by the article 26 of the whole list providing Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts: 
Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in 
conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general 
international law.
130
 
Further, it is necessary to clarify if not from the international human rights law perspective, 
then at least from the commentaries for the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts which norms for the purposes of ascertaining the responsibility 
of states are considered peremptory. Thus, part five of the commentary for the aforementioned 
article 26 contains the following explanation. 
Those peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and recognized include the 
prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against 
humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination.
131
 
This leaves no doubt as to the nature of self-determination as an international norm. By 
making attempts to deprive the peoples of Bangladesh, South Carolina, Chechnya and Kosovo 
of the right to remedial secession, the federal sovereigns have committed clear-cut 
international wrongful acts. Moreover, genocide and crimes against humanity supplemented 
with torture were not absent in the denial of self-determination. 
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Although the concept of “internationally wrongful acts” has been decriminalized throughout 
the ILC drafts on articles of state responsibility,
132
 it should be concluded that exercise of the 
remedial secession in the view of breach of peremptory norms not only illustratively 
demonstrates an entirely legitimate cause for secession, but also entails a further legal step to 
be taken. In this regard, the peoples should not be perceived as the perpetrators against the 
territorial integrity of states. Rather, the states should be viewed as condemnable international 
wrongdoers that perpetrate breaches of the most cherished peremptory norms and their 
legitimate exercise thereof by unjustifiably preserving territorial integrity by unlawful means.  
To sum up, commission of an internationally wrongful act that involves the breach of the 
article 26 should logically entail an automatic right to remedial secession. This would 
certainly mean criminalization of violation of the self-determination of peoples on the basis of 
principle of ultimum remedium. As seen from the analysed cases, lesser measures are not 
likely to succeed, for a graver crime than the breach of a peremptory norm may not be thought 
of at all.
133  
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CONCLUSION 
The right to remedial secession can with a solid ground be claimed as a customary 
international law rule in the absence of express treaty provisions. As a source of international 
law, it should carry no less legal force, since the state practice concerning the matter provides 
quite self-explanatory criteria of the circumstances in which remedial secession is legally 
permissible. Although always left for ad hoc evaluation of each specific case, a provisory 
framework of what legalizes remedial secession can successfully be developed. 
First and foremost, remedial secession may be described as a federal phenomenon solely. 
What is so peculiar about the federal states, is the exercise of their power granted by the 
federal constitution at the expense of autonomy of its federal subjects that have formed this 
particular federal sovereign at their free will. The case does not pertain to the unitary states, 
since abuse of power by the sovereign cannot be said to have been exercised in a clear 
contravention with the social contract between different and entirely separate groups of 
people and the sovereign. The peoples of non-federal states may not claim rights they have 
never possessed and hence never deprived of. 
Further, it is useful to sum up the circumstances that have emerged as the qualifying criteria 
for remedial secession from the illustrative federalist secessions of Bangladesh, South 
Carolina, Chechnya and Kosovo. These are, in particular, denial of internal self-
determination, violent suppression of secessionist and independence movements, presence of 
a humanitarian element, possibly even with commission of a war crime by the federal 
sovereign, breach of state continuity doctrine. It may be added that a sui generis circumstance 
of remedial secession, as exemplified by Kosovo, is change of the political and legal status of 
the federal subject to its detriment. 
An assertion can also be made that an integral element of legitimation of remedial secession is 
the effectiveness of existence of an independent unit thereof. Although this is a post-facto 
criterion, it cannot be denied that secession as such does not have any practical meaning 
without effective existence. Thus, since remedial secession is said to exist in a form of 
customary law, the exercise of this right shall also be subject to the test of effectiveness. 
Despite the state practice being quite extensive on the invocation of the right to remedial 
secession, the legality of remedial secession suffers from its practical inexistence in the 
international statutory law. No matter, how convincing and prolific the explanation of 
remedial circumstances provided by state practice is, it will always be quite complicated to 
invoke a phenomenon not expressly defined in authoritative legal texts, nor ever mentioned 
explicitly in case-law of the ICJ. Indeed, circumstances that qualify for remedial secession 
may practically be present, although the changing nature of facts and the equivocal 
interpretation of what happened through the principle of ex factis jus oritur may lead to abuse 
by the federal sovereigns of their power to deny right to self-determination and remedial 
secession. 
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Fortunately, a promising movement towards a greater respect of right to self-determination is 
pervasive. Undoubtedly, the concept has far exceeded its initial meaning that was confined to 
the realm of decolonization. It can now be claimed that self-determination has truly evolved 
into a nearly full-fledged right to secession. The “remedial” connotation here, albeit currently 
bearing the nature of a constraining factor to the general right to secession, can reasonably be 
expected to develop beyond its status of exception. The moment when violations of human 
rights of a lesser extent would legitimate secession, it could validly be asserted that the 
“remedial” element is obsolete and a gradually disappearing concept of international law. 
Overall, the international community is undeniably shifting from the state-centric perception 
of international relations to an anthropocentric one. Where violations of human rights outside 
the colonial possessions were once remedied at best with the internal self-determination or 
imposition of a status of non-self-governing territory, external self-determination now comes 
into play as the democratic and libertarian expression of a human value. While earlier human 
rights could be complied with strictly within the limits of territorial integrity of sovereigns, 
now the individual human supersedes political, legal and territorial boundaries. The 
international community is currently experiencing the dawn of human rights era, as 
spectacular and overwhelming as never precipitated before. 
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